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Abstract. This paper discusses the economics of electronic identity (eIdentity) 
from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Personal identity data are be-
coming increasingly important in online transactions, and they have never been 
monetised to the extent they are today. Consequently, there is a need for an im-
proved understanding of the economic externalities resulting from the electronic 
use of identities in transactions. In this context, we distinguish four main theo-
retical approaches for understanding economics of identity: identity as a con-
sumption good, identity as a capital asset, identity as a social good, and identity 
as a cost. We analyse each of these approaches in terms of their benefits to un-
derstanding economics of identity, their drawbacks, and the bearer of the cost of 
identity provision. After the theoretical part, we go on to discuss three case 
studies, BBS, eBay and IdenTrust, and apply an appropriate concept of eco-
nomics of identity to analyse each business case. Finally, we conclude the paper 
by discussing the implications that each of the different concepts of economics 
of identity has for policymakers. 
1   Introduction 
1.1   Background 
Identity as a concept has been known for centuries. In the past identity has often been 
treated as a social good with some externalities or simply as a cost, but its full economic 
significance is becoming increasingly apparent. Today, personal identity data are vital to 
the way Internet services are provided, and to citizens' everyday life. Especially in 
online transactions, personal identity data are becoming an important enabler of the 
digital economy. They have a crucial role to play in setting the framework conditions so 
as to sustain this shift while maximising the benefits for economy and society. 
The economic importance of electronic identities is increasing for several reasons. 
Firstly, electronic identification is today indispensable to ensure access to public and 
private services – including health, education and security. More and more of the 
personal sphere is recorded, stored and analysed (for example, in the case of nominal 
e-ticketing, in which identity tags are attached to transactions that were previously 
anonymous). Identity transactions are based on an increasing number and variety of 
identity systems. In the Internet, a heterogeneous system of identity assurance has 
emerged over time, through a mix of open standardisation, engineering ingenuity and 
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sheer monopolistic inertia. There is today a plethora of sector specific solutions 
(based on e.g. SSL encryption, PIN, tokens) and e-services (e.g. based on a PKI infra-
structure with either strong or weak authentication).  
Secondly, the personal identity data of citizens are being used today in two differ-
ent ways. The first one is to provide access to information and services; this is the 
'authentication function' of identity. In addition, however, the personal identifiers used 
for authentication leave digital traces that may also be used for other, unintended 
purposes. Profiling – the attribution of identity based on data mining criteria – both 
for profit (mainly businesses) and security (mainly governments), is on the rise. Other 
non-personal identifiers may be linked to personal data (as in the case of IP addresses 
and object tags), and there may be increasing linking of EU citizens' identity to their 
online and offline activities.  
Thirdly, the number of transactions carried out with personal identity data has grown 
significantly in the past few years, and will most likely continue to do so. Consequently, 
businesses are increasingly trying to profit from the use of personal identity data for 
their own gain. There is a tension between the collection of personal data in business-to-
consumer transactions and the respect for consumers' privacy preferences. This presents 
new challenges for policymakers: how to ensure that business abide by current regula-
tions, addressing the challenges to privacy and data protection, while at the same time 
supporting the economic development of electronic identities and services based on 
them. Overall, the purposes for which identity data are used today cover a significantly 
larger spectrum than just authentication. Most significantly, activities such as targeted 
advertising, based on collected identity data, are becoming more and more common, 
and in this context there has been an emergence of numerous profiling models (advertis-
ing, crime detection, compliance with rules, health monitoring). The economic attrac-
tiveness of such activities is clear; indeed, personal identity data have never been 
monetised to the extent occurring today. While the economic significance of such activi-
ties is largely invisible at the moment, emerging mobile, sensor and social networking 
technologies facilitate the creation of novel services that, in addition to their other func-
tions, enable users to perceive the economic importance of their electronic identities. 
Furthermore, as distributed systems are assembled from components that have been 
created for different purposes, economic incentives are becoming as important as tech-
nical design in achieving system dependability; without economic incentives there may 
not be sufficient motivation for different companies to ensure the compatibility of their 
applications with large-scale systems.  
Due to the economic importance of electronic identity, the economics of identity 
need to be understood in a much more systematic and formalised way than has  
traditionally been the case. Relatively little is known about how identities are used in 
economic transactions (either as an enabler or as part of the transaction), what is the 
economic value of the identity data, how it could be measured, and what business mod-
els support the use of electronic identity. This analysis is necessary to quantify the eco-
nomic significance of the identity market, and to understand how the dynamics of the 
identity markets function. It is only through this understanding that policymakers are 
able to effectively regulate the identity space. The drawback of analysing economics of 
identity in this sense is that to date, there is no clearly defined framework for this analy-
sis; therefore it would take policymakers a significant amount of additional effort to 
carry out this task reliably and in appropriate detail.  
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In this paper, the term eIdentity is used to indicate a set of personal information 
and data relevant to a human's identity (personal and/or collective identity data) when 
stored and transmitted via electronic systems, including but not limited to computer 
networks. The terms electronic identity, digital identity and eID are also used to the 
same purpose in the literature. 
1.2   Research Questions 
Evidently, there is a clear need for improved understanding of the economic external-
ities of electronic identification. A much more detailed analysis is needed of how 
exactly identity functions as an economic object, what kind of consequences this has 
both from a theoretical perspective and for policymakers, and how these conse-
quences can be efficiently managed and regulated. To gain a fuller understanding of 
these issues, we need a framework that looks into the economics from various angles, 
distinguishes between different ways of understanding them, and looks at how they 
can be applied in different business contexts. 
We foresee that different concepts of economics of identity can be classified into 
distinct approaches, or schools of thought. Each of them will have different conse-
quences in terms of how identity is defined as an economic object, and how the asso-
ciated economic externalities can be analysed. Further, each approach has its own set 
of benefits and drawbacks, with regard to what kind of analysis it allows; researching 
these benefits and limitations provides an overview of the different issues and consid-
erations that must be taken into account. In order to arrive at a fuller understanding of 
the economics of identity, it is necessary to map out the various economically relevant 
aspects of eIdentity.  
We therefore propose the following research questions that this paper seeks to an-
swer: 1) What approaches to economics of identity can be identified? 2) How does 
each of them contribute to our understanding of the economics of eIdentity? 3) How 
can these approaches be applied to existing companies in the marketplace? 4) In light 
of all this, what kind of policy implications does this raise for policymakers? 
2   Ways of Understanding Economics of Identity 
In this chapter, we discuss four possible approaches to understand economics of iden-
tity by defining each, describing the challenges each one solves, discussing their limi-
tations, providing an example of how each approach can be applied, and finally by 
concluding how this approach helps us understand economics of identity. 
2.1   Identity as a Consumption Good 
One way to grasp the economics of identity is to analyse identity as a consumption 
good, in which case users choose their identity according to how and where they want 
to use it [1]. In this case, identity results from explicit choices by the individual. This 
implies that personal identity data are transactable and can be sold, either temporarily 
or permanently. In turn, this understanding of identity raises questions of what pur-
poses identity can be used for, how long it remains valid for, and what contractual 
regimes would be applicable. Identity could also be stolen; this raises issues concern-
ing trust in the transaction environment, accountability, individual responsibility, and 
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appropriate adoption of identity. The classic economic approach to analyse identity as 
a consumption good is economics of choice. Identity can then be analysed by intro-
ducing it as a factor in the utility function as in general economics [2]. 
'Identity as a consumption good' provides several insights into how these econom-
ics function. First, it describes in detail how identities can be used in economic trans-
actions and the possible value of identity in such transactions. Second, the approach 
allows taking into consideration the fact that people have different identities in differ-
ent situations and use cases, and that personal identity data can be used in varying 
ways according to the context. Thus this approach goes a long way towards explain-
ing why the value of the person's identity or personal identity data can differ signifi-
cantly in varying circumstances. Third, it also brings to the fore the active role that 
the user may have in managing her personal data: as the user chooses which data are 
the most relevant to the context. The economic consequences that result from this 
choice of personal data, and the level of personal responsibility required from the 
user, vary according to the type of data. 
Despite the above described assets, this approach has some clear limitations. The 
approach is quite complex and to accurately determine the value of identity in a par-
ticular case would be very difficult. It would be necessary to have a detailed under-
standing of the case in question and would mean that a lot of data is at the disposal of 
the stakeholder assessing the value of the identity. The approach also places a heavy 
burden on the user: the user may have to not only collect and manage, but to process 
large amounts of information to make informed decisions. 
As a consequence of these limitations, the resultant identity markets would likely 
be very complex, as the circumstances in which identities are used can vary im-
mensely. This would probably lead to inequity between stakeholders and inefficiency 
in the market. The problem could also be exacerbated by the technical constraints of 
the transaction environment. Secondly, this approach may require too much effort or 
access to information on the part of the users: not everyone will be active enough, or 
well-informed enough, to adequately manage her personal identity data in all circum-
stances. The most ICT-savvy users would possibly be ready and willing to manage 
this information, but this would not be the case for all users. Thirdly, there is a sig-
nificant contrast between user-stated privacy attitudes and their actual privacy-related 
behaviour. In general, it may be unreasonable to expect complete individual rational-
ity in the context of online transactions. Models of self-control problems and immedi-
ate gratification studied by some scholars may offer more realistic descriptions of 
users' decision-making processes, and explain why even individuals who genuinely 
want to protect their privacy might not do so. These risks become even higher when 
the individuals concerned do not perceive the risks resulting from not protecting their 
privacy as significant [3].  
As an example of the contrast between user attitudes and user behaviour, Acquisti 
et al. have conducted an experiment for two scenarios: willingness to pay for protect-
ing personal information, and willingness to accept a proposal to sell information. 
Their results show a clear preference for money over data across the vast majority of 
participants in both information protection and information release scenarios, even 
when the monetary advantage is low. In addition, the average willingness to accept 
(the second case) is dramatically higher than the average willingness to protect [4].  
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Acquisti et al. have also studied why consumers do not always act as rational 
agents. Their research confirms that consumers often lack enough information to 
make privacy-sensitive decisions and, even with sufficient information, are likely to 
trade off long-term privacy for short-term gains. The three most important reasons for 
consumers not to act rationally are incomplete information, bounded rationality (in-
ability to process and act on vast amounts of data), and systematic psychological 
deviations from rationality. The latter includes the tendency to favour immediate 
gratification to future benefit, the possibility to avoid loss being more important than 
the possibility to win a profit (of the same magnitude), notions of altruism, and fair-
ness instead of private gain [5]. 
Spiekermann et al. conducted an experiment in which they compared the self-
reported privacy preferences of 171 participants with their actual behaviour during an 
online shopping episode. Their findings suggest that current approaches such as legis-
lation to protect user privacy may not do so effectively, since they assume that con-
sumers are privacy conscious and act accordingly. In the study it was found that most 
people did not live up to their self-reported preferences, and in fact tended to respond 
to the majority of questions asked from them during an online shopping session, even 
if they were highly personal. The varying privacy statements on different websites 
had no impact on the type of information disclosed. This suggests that people are 
prone to disregard privacy concerns once engaged in a transaction [6]. 
To conclude, to deal with identity as a consumption good contributes to our under-
standing of economics of identity according to classical and behavioural economics. It 
is market-centric: the cost of identity provision can be understood to be borne by the 
market, i.e. the highest bidder will manage "my" identity. A significant drawback of 
this approach is that it requires some idealised assumptions about user behaviour, and 
how users behave in real life may not conform with theory.  
2.2   Identity as a Capital Asset 
We can also discuss identity as a capital asset. In this case, identity is regarded a 
property that can be publicly traded. Identity will have a changing value over time and 
space, because people's valuation of their identity changes with time and social con-
text. When identity is understood as property, the value of pieces (i.e. value of iden-
tity in different contexts) does not equal the value of the ensemble. Therefore, the 
changing value of identity is considered both over time (time inconsistency in value 
of identity, deferred rewards) and over space (people value their identity differently in 
different social spaces, use of identity changes the value of identity). 
In common with the understanding of identity as a consumption good, 'identity as a 
capital asset' recognises the changing value of identity data in different use contexts. 
It also allows for the time value of identity, recognizing the fact that the same person 
may place a drastically different value on his personal identity data purely because 
time has passed and this information has a different value in the new situation. This 
approach also recognises the fact that the value of identity can change when it is used, 
and may increase or decrease in value depending on the changes caused by the use. 
Understanding identity as a capital asset carries with it a number of challenges. 
Firstly, there are obvious difficulties in measuring the value. There is also the risk of 
misrepresentation. This may occur through an erroneous combination of parts of the 
whole by not recognizing all value-generating aspects of identity, or by considering 
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only the most recent information and ignoring what was done a long time ago. We 
must also take into account the difficulties in predicting future behaviour, which mean 
that to estimate the value of identity in future carries with it a large inherent risk. All 
these challenges mean that to analyse identity as a capital asset, though in theory 
feasible, can in practice result in unreliable estimates of its value.  
However, the dynamics of identity as a capital asset can be studied through behav-
ioural economics and game theory. In his paper, Cave (2004) discusses the economics 
of trust according to some simple game theoretic models of specific aspects of trust, 
in order to analyse how balanced and efficient they are. He discusses the potential 
tension between efficiency and equilibrium, both in terms of the prevalence of trust 
behaviour and the network of relationships to which the need to trust others gives rise. 
In addition, he seeks to identify conditions under which different levels of trust may 
be widespread and conditions under which a diversity of behaviour is likely. One 
unexpected consequence of the latter conditions is the existence of ‘catastrophes’ – 
discontinuous jumps in the level of trust in response to small changes in underlying 
conditions [7]. Acquisti et al. have also carried out trust modelling for online transac-
tions. The increasing amount of spam, phishing and other attacks increase users' un-
certainty over the consequences of their actions and their distrust towards other online 
parties. From this starting point, they have developed a theoretical model to represent 
and compare the online trust decision processes of users, though they do not give any 
direct results of user behaviour [8]. Furthermore, Ba et al. have discussed the problem 
of uncertain quality in electronic commerce transactions. They investigate how the 
trust necessary for online exchange of products and services can be promoted when 
individuals have short-term temptations to cheat. As a solution, they propose a design 
of an economic incentive mechanism that serves to encourage consumer confidence in 
conducting online business transactions [9].  
On the whole, understanding identity as a capital asset is a valuable addition to 
theory, especially with regard to changes in the value of identity according to its use 
and the passing of time. It also helps us understand the dynamics of economics of 
identity in different use contexts. A significant limitation is that it requires a very high 
amount of data to yield accurate results about the economic value of identity. It is 
worth noting that when we deal with identity as a capital asset, the cost of identity 
provision rests primarily with the individual. In this respect, this approach clearly 
differs from understanding identity as a consumption good. 
2.3   Identity as a Social Good 
The third way to analyse economics of identity is as a social good (where the esteem 
and reputation of a person have economic externalities). In this case, identity (or to be 
more precise, aspects of the personal identity data of individuals) is understood to 
have network effects, meaning that identity increases in economic value by its in-
creased use (by companies, by people). If identity is understood as a social good, one 
question to ask if identity is to be publicly provided, and as such cannot be used in 
transactions. In this case, it would mean that identity is permanent: one (nationally 
provided) identity would stay with the citizen for the duration of his life. Another 
possibility for the provision of identity is that it be provided by a collective of persons 
or organisations. This would mean expanding the concept of identity to groups, i.e. 
not only individuals, but also social networks composed of individuals would have 
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identities of their own. New research activity has emerged around analysing social 
networks and studying "communities of interest"; this research field has largely been 
driven forward by sociologists, though there is also relevant work by economists such 
as Amartya Sen [10]. 'Identity as a social good' can most gainfully be applied to social 
networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook and mySpace. 
Identity as a social good is a valuable point of view especially because it provides 
tools to understand the network effects of personal identity data. It gives insights into 
how the value of identity increases as more people use it, and as it becomes more 
widely diffused. It gives us a means to analyse how SNSs actually function from an 
economic point of view, by explaining the means through which they provide eco-
nomic value to their users. The central concept here is that of reputation: how other 
people's perception of what you are like affects their relations with you, and the re-
sulting economic value of these relations. 
While this understanding of identity has several advantages, there are also some 
moot points. First, it leaves unclear the role of the identity provider. As discussed 
above, if it is provided publicly, identity cannot then be analysed as a transactional 
good. It would also be unclear whether identity would be a permanent or temporary 
one; hence, this understanding leaves open questions of the time value of identity. 
Second, this approach does not address questions of collective identity, or what their 
dynamics would be like. To understand the collective aspects of identity is essential to 
any comprehensive analysis of identity, since so many of today's transactions are 
carried out between groups or organisations, not individuals.  
Some research exists on what kind of information citizens wish to share and what 
they wish to keep to themselves. For example, Varian has argued that consumers will 
rationally want certain kinds of information about themselves to be available to the 
public, but other types not (e.g. financially sensitive information). Varian says that 
there are cases where there is a public interest in having some personal information 
publicly available; making information available about owners of motor vehicles may 
ensure their safer operation. In these cases, the public does not really care about your 
personal information, but desires access to the information because it is relevant to 
their interests [11].  
Overall, analysing identity as a social good brings valuable contributions to our 
understanding as it introduces network effects and the changing value of identity 
(according to esteem and reputation) into the discussion. However, by itself this is not 
sufficient, as the analysis for the most part does not take into account the transactional 
nature of identity. Further, when we discuss identity as a social good, its value in-
creases with its diffusion in the network, while its cost stays the same; in other words, 
the more you use your identity data, the more added value you are able to gain from 
it. This has a tendency to boost the use of the data by citizens, thereby contributing to 
the growth of the market. However, as the use of identity data increases, so do the 
associated problems. 
2.4   Identity as a Cost 
Finally, the conventional way to understand identity is purely as a cost. This means that 
the economic value of identity is only recognized as far as it incurs costs for the differ-
ent stakeholders (governments, companies, consumers). For example, the costs of pri-
vacy enhancing technologies have been studied in this context. Another possibility is to 
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look at costs of identity theft: what is the economic loss, both direct and indirect, caused 
by the theft of people's online identities. Governments, for example, incur huge infra-
structure costs to protect their identity management systems from unauthorised access. 
In this approach to economics of identity, the concept of cost has at least two meanings: 
the cost of what people have lost, or the cost they have to pay in order to protect their 
identity.  
The key benefit of this approach is that it allows us to distinguish and study the 
various identity related costs. The main limitation is equally obvious: the identity 
related benefits are not considered. However, the costs associated with identity are 
much easier to estimate than the gains, which makes studying them worthwhile, if 
only to help us understand how much identity related transactions would have to 
contribute to the economy to offset the related costs. Therefore, the cost of identity 
provision will most likely be borne by the market, through the benefits brought about 
by increased security and control. 
As an example, some scholars have studied the cost of privacy breaches in terms of 
their impact on the company's market value. These studies show that there is a nega-
tive correlation between data breaches and the company's market value. Although 
initially significant, the effect decreases and loses statistical significance rather 
quickly (even within days), suggesting that the public will quite rapidly recover its 
confidence in the company [12]. 
Another example of analysing identity as a cost is the economics of malicious soft-
ware (malware). While its origins clearly lie in criminal behaviour, some scholars have 
argued that the magnitude and impact of the malware threat have also been influenced 
by the decisions and behaviour of legitimate market players such as ISPs, software 
providers, hardware vendors and consumers. Namely, in many cases these stakeholders 
may not be adequately incentivised to operate in ways that contribute to the highest 
possible security, and there may even be market-based incentive mechanisms that 
contribute to misuse of information. For example, it is often very easy for companies to 
collect information about their customers, their preferences, habitual ways of using the 
system, and so on; while this information may be appropriately used by, financially 
beneficial for, the company in question, there is always the possibility of a third party 
finding out this information and using it for illegal purposes [13].  
In this context, Laudon (1997) has studied market mechanisms of pricing informa-
tion. He posits that the crisis in the privacy of personal information is a result of mar-
ket failure, not rapid technological development. He believes this to be a market fail-
ure, which has occurred as a result of a poor allocation of personal property rights: the 
collector of the information has too many rights, the individuals concerned too few. 
While the financial rewards for privacy invasion can be huge for companies, the indi-
viduals do not understand how their personal data will be used, the means of indi-
viduals for obtaining information about the use of data are limited, and the costs of 
finding out this information can be very high [14].  
Hann et al. (2002) have studied the value of information privacy in the presence of 
potential benefits from sharing personal information. They found that the potential 
benefits, both direct monetary rewards and future convenience, significantly affect 
user preferences in relation to the use of websites with different privacy policies. 
They also investigated the monetary value of website privacy protection, and  
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estimated that among US subjects in September 2002, the value of protection against 
errors, improper access, and secondary use of personal information is between $30 
and $45 per person annually [15].  
Furthermore, Andrew Odlyzko has studied security as a component of a complex 
economy (not as an isolated good). In his view, it follows that security can never be 
optimally effective, but instead will always be subject to severe constraints created by 
other parts of the economy. He further argues that the interactions of human society 
and human nature suggest that security will continue to be applied as an afterthought, 
not as a primary design goal of ICT systems. Therefore, it would be most productive 
to think of security not as a way to provide ironclad protection, but as the equivalent 
of speed bumps, which decrease the velocity and impact of electronic attacks to a 
level where other protection mechanisms can operate [16].  
On the whole, the definition of identity as a cost does not really deal with identity, 
but more with privacy and data protection. The positive, i.e. value-generating, effects 
of identity are not taken into account, which makes this definition somewhat unsatis-
factory. However, this approach can be used to highlight the fact that the cost of iden-
tity provision could (and probably should) be borne by the associated benefits such as 
increased security and better control of the use of identities. 
2.5   Summary of Different Approaches  
In the table below we summarise the benefits and limitations of each approach to 
economics of identity, with special emphasis on the consequences that each one has 
for the analysis of economic externalities. 
Table 1. Benefits and drawbacks of various approaches to understanding economics of identity 
Consumption 
good 
Capital asset Social good Identity as a 
cost
Benefits
for 
analysis 
Identity as a 
transactional 
good: different 
externalities 
depending on type 
of transaction 
Changing value of 
identity according 
to context: 
identity as a 
'market good' 
Identity chosen 
and managed by 
the user, who 
gains control and 
Identity as a 
transactional 
good: economic 
externalities vary 
depending on type 
of transaction and 
user actions 
Changing value of 
identity according 
to context: 
identity traded in 
the public 
marketplace 
Time value of 
identity: time 
factor can be 
Economics of 
esteem and 
reputation:
analyses the 
economic value 
of how we (our 
identities) are 
appreciated by 
others
Network effects 
of identity: 
explains how 
increased use 
and recognition 
of identity 
contribute to the 
economic value 
Distinguishes
between 
different 
identity related 
costs and 
explains how 
each affects the 
identity's value 
Provides
estimates of 
costs for privacy 
enhancing
software, online 
fraud, identity 
theft etc. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
ownership
A solid theoretical 
basis from 
classical 
economics
introduced to 
economic analysis 
Changing value of 
identity according 
to its use; helps 
understand
fluctuations in 
value of identity  
Recognises that 
value of pieces =/ 
value of all; value 
can be measured 
in specific cases 
without analysing 
others
of the system 
Analysis of 
economics of 
SNSs; how do 
such companies 
generate value? 
Draw- 
backs
Results in very 
complex identity 
markets; hence 
limited 
possibilities to 
understand and 
regulate the 
market 
Requires
significant effort 
from user; what 
are the user 
liabilities in case 
of misuse of 
identity? 
Privacy paradox: 
users are less 
concerned by their 
privacy than they 
claim to be 
Difficulties in 
measurement; 
possible lack of 
reliable financial 
data
Difficulties in 
recognising all 
value-generating 
aspects of 
identity; a lot of 
groundwork to be 
done before 
economic analysis 
Requires many 
assumptions about 
users' future 
behaviour
Does not clearly 
define the role 
of identity 
provider: it is 
not clear who 
controls the 
identity data and 
how, and how 
they will be 
affected by 
economic
externalities 
Does not 
address
collective 
identities 
Only analyses 
the costs, not 
the value-
generating
aspects of 
identity; thus 
the analysis will 
only provide 
"half a picture" 
Cost to 
provide
identity 
Will be borne by 
market or 
company, 
enabling the use 
of more advanced 
e-services  
Will be borne by 
user, who retains 
control and 
ownership
Bearer unclear; 
should decrease 
the more 
identity is used 
Should be offset 
by increased 
security, 
control, etc. 
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3   Case Studies 
In this chapter, we analyse the activities of three companies as practical examples of 
how different approaches to economics of identity can be used to understand the iden-
tity market. For our analysis, we have chosen BBS, eBay and IdenTrust because they 
have three clearly different product and service offerings and three distinct ways of 
operation. BBS is used to illustrate identity as a consumption good, eBay identity as a 
social good and IdenTrust identity as a cost. 
3.1   BBS Global Validation Service [17] 
BBS is a Nordic company offering identity solutions to manage risks and provide 
certification services. Their service offering includes managed public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI), managed one-time passwords, validation services, smartcards, and tokens. 
These services are accepted by several government organisations in addition to the 
marketplace, which distinguishes them from other similar services. This is a signifi-
cant development, given that governments in general are very wary of accepting 
commercial credentials and instead prefer to rely on their own solutions. As the secu-
rity standards of the commercial products are constantly improving, this lack of  
acceptance may be more of an issue of suitability of commercial credentials for gov-
ernmental purposes, rather than concerns about their lack of reliability. 
In general terms, international companies need to handle the complexity of verify-
ing different kinds of signatures and to validate certificates from various issuers 
worldwide. This is the main challenge that BBS seeks to address. They offer valida-
tion services that seek to solve the complex problem of offering signature verification 
and certificate validation as a service for the receiving party. In this way, their cus-
tomer can obtain a solution designed to manage different signatures and certificates 
worldwide. Effective use of digital signatures, especially across national frontiers, 
reduces costs and complexity of using PKI in global e-business. The service also 
effectively helps to connect different closed eID communities. Ultimately, BBS aims 
to function as a single, independent trust provider, which offers one set of standards 
and one software package for processing of signatures and certificates, as well as 
effective risk management for using PKI in global business transactions. 
BBS operates in two distinct segments of the eIdentity market: they offer multi-
purpose ID schemes for heterogeneous citizen-merchant markets, and tailored PKI 
solutions, with more stringent security parameters, whose users are typically enter-
prise customers with transactions taking place in closed environments [18]. The most 
important product of BBS is the Identity Management Platform. Developed in 2008,  
it is used for issuing, managing and using digital certificates online. It can handle 
different Certificate Authority (CA) platforms and validation technologies, thereby 
providing BBS with the flexibility to adapt their certification to the specific needs of 
individual customers and transactions. The BBS Identity Manager is used to provide 
all their identification services, including enterprise PKI, mobile PKI, EU-qualified 
and standard certificates. It can also be used to provide one-time passwords and vali-
dation of individual transactions. Because of these characteristics, the BBS Identity 
Management Platform works well as an example of identity as a consumption good. 
The service incorporates the nature of identity as a transactional good, something that 
can easily play one role in a certain context and a different one in another. Moreover, 
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these services take into account the changing value of identity depending on the type 
of transaction, and accordingly there are different types and levels of security for 
specific transactions as appropriate. In general, BBS services have been developed 
with a modular design, allowing their customers to choose the most appropriate com-
bination of identification mechanisms.  
The activities of BBS in these markets are complemented by their participation in 
international expert groups such as European Committee for Banking Standards (Mo-
bile Payments Workgroup) and Mobey Forum (Mobile Authentication and Business 
Ecosystem), and standardisation groups such as European Payment Council (EPC) 
and European Committee for Banking Standards (ECBS). Their participation in these 
bodies enables them to offer identity solutions that fit better with specific use cases 
and transactions, as well as influence the future development of the industry. 
When we analyse identity as a consumption good, identity is something chosen and 
managed by the user. In the BBS case, the customer company gains control and own-
ership of the certified identity, enabling them to manage the identity according to their 
particular needs. This also means that the customer company can use several identities 
and sets of identity data. In this situation, it is obvious that the value of identity de-
pends on the transaction and context it is used in; the identity may even be part of the 
transaction itself, as befits this school of thought, though this is not explicitly speci-
fied by BBS. 
Even though the customer company manages its own identity, we must bear in 
mind that BBS, as the identity provider, has a large role in assisting the customer 
choose the form of identity to be used. This may in practice lessen the influence that 
the customer company has over the choice and use of their identity. However, it is 
always the customer who makes the ultimate decision, with BBS having just an advi-
sory and supportive role. The large role of the provider may also be an advantage: as 
discussed in this paper, one of the key drawbacks of analysing identity as a consump-
tion good is that it requires significant effort from the user, but in this particular case 
the effort is mediated by BBS.  
The activities of BBS also go some way towards addressing the privacy paradox: 
although users are generally less conscious of their information security than they 
claim to be, a company such as BBS helps them see the risks more clearly and man-
age them appropriately. We might even say that such companies are needed because 
their customers don't understand the risks well enough. Hopefully, this state of affairs 
will change over time as both personal and business users become more conscious of 
the benefits and risks associated with online identification; however, at the moment, 
companies like BBS still have a useful role to play/ 
In the business model of BBS, the cost of identity provision rests with the customer 
companies, as they need the electronic identities to provide their financial services. 
Generally, these companies are able to charge these costs from their own customers in 
the form of service fees and the like, so ultimately the cost of identity provision rests 
with the market. In this way, too, the BBS services deal with identity as a consumption 
good. 
3.2   eBay [19] 
eBay is a US-based company specialising in online auctions and sale of nearly  
any type of merchandise. In eBay, each seller has his own profile that is rated by the 
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people who have bought products from this particular seller. The most highly rated 
sellers acquire the status of "Power Seller", while lowly rated sellers may be excluded 
from eBay altogether. In this way, eBay closely resembles any social networking site 
with significant user interaction and rating of individual users by their peers. 
The key to operations of eBay is the economics of reputation. It is not possible for 
the buyer to directly examine the product, and so he must rely on whatever informa-
tion he can get of the seller when deciding on how to bid. The way a particular seller 
handles his sales, how reliably he ships the purchases, how promptly he answers re-
quests from information, and so on, all affect his rating in eBay. Therefore the identity 
of a user has a particular value in eBay; the higher the rating, the higher the value of 
user identity. This is in line with considering identity as a social good. 
Several studies have been made on how to quantify the value of the identity in 
eBay. Resnick et al. conducted an experiment in which a high-reputation, established 
eBay dealer sold matched products both under his regular identity and under new 
seller identities, which were in reality also operated under him. As predicted, the 
established identity fared better. They found that the difference in buyers’ willing-
ness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. They then conducted a second experiment 
in the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without 
negative feedback. Surprisingly, they found out that one or two negative feedbacks 
for the new sellers did not affect willingness-to-pay [20]. Melnik et al. have made a 
similar empirical study of the value of the seller's reputation in eBay. Their conclu-
sion is that the seller's reputation has a positive and statistically significant, but small, 
impact on the price [21].  
The rating structure of eBay generates network effects, which are a cornerstone of 
understanding identity as a social good. As the ratings of individual sellers change, 
the ones with higher ratings are likely to attract more business with regard to peers 
who have the same product. If users buy more from a particular seller because of his 
high rating and are satisfied, they may then rate the seller highly, boosting his rating 
yet again. Conversely, low ratings may generate distrust and a tendency to rate a 
seller lowly even if he does not "really" deserve it, thus creating a polarising effect. 
People tend not to form their opinions in a vacuum, but instead rely heavily on the 
opinions and prejudices of other people. These network effects are often magnified 
online, as people have access to the opinions and experiences of a much higher num-
ber of people than would be possible in the physical world. In effect, eBay functions 
as a trusted third party who "guarantees" the credit ratings of individual sellers. By 
providing its credit rating information, they give buyers and sellers the confidence to 
trade with unknown trading partners, improving market liquidity [22].  
When analysing identity as a social good, a significant drawback is that it often 
leaves some important questions unanswered. For instance, it does not address the 
question of collective identities; in eBay, by analogue, there is no possibility for such 
an actor as a "collective seller". Similarly, the eBay example can only be used to un-
derstand the economic value of identities of individual actors. Also, there may be 
issues of too strict or too lenient ratings by buyers, meaning that two sellers with 
similar products cannot be directly compared [23].  
In this particular school of thought, the bearer of the cost of identity provision is 
not specified. However, in the eBay business model the bearer of this cost is very  
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clear, as it rests squarely with the user. This is the case because eBay charges a fee 
both for placing an item for sale and for each transaction, generating income accord-
ing to economic value and number of products.  
3.3   IdenTrust [24] 
IdenTrust is a technology provider whose main product is a PKI-based identification 
system, used both by governments and private companies, with the finance sector as 
their main client. They issue credentials and provide a supporting infrastructure in-
cluding operational, technological and legal services. The IdenTrust credentials are 
designed to provide three key capabilities: authentication (provision of identity), en-
cryption (safeguarding content, eliminating unauthorised access) and digital signing 
(user-level signatures of specific transactions).  
The IdenTrust credentials are designed to provide three key capabilities: authenti-
cation (provision of identity), encryption (safeguarding content, eliminating unauthor-
ised access) and digital signature (user-level signatures of specific transactions). In 
addition, IdenTrust credentials are designed to comply with relevant anti-money laun-
dering or other anti-abuse regulations (i.e. Sarbanes-Oxley and HIPAA health data 
regulations).  
 
Fig. 1. Functioning of the IdenTrust Trust Network  
(source: IdenTrust, ref. #25) 
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IdenTrust products enable companies make authentication an integral part of their 
business processes and so to be able to conduct their operations reliably and securely 
over the Internet beyond fulfilling their legal obligations. IdenTrust products rely on 
an open standard that can be used by financial institutions to gain interoperability and 
legal acceptance in 120 countries. The membership of the IdenTrust network is re-
stricted to institutions that agree to abide by the conditions set by IdenTrust, thereby 
ensuring that the standard is utilised in an appropriate manner. IdenTrust policies 
govern who receives the identity and how each individual or business is vetted to 
guarantee they really are who they say they are, along with making certain that the 
process is done consistently everywhere around the world. IdenTrust identities en-
crypt and control the process flows, in order to prevent the interception of a transac-
tion, in this way combating phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
The Trust Network operates as follows. It first specifies how a digital identity  
certificate can be issued and how it is validated. The transaction data and signed cer-
tificate are exchanged between the stakeholders involved in the transaction. The mes-
sages related to the transaction data are exchanged between the customers on either 
end of the transaction. IdenTrust only validates the identities used by these customers, 
not the data associated with the transaction. The transaction data itself is never passed 
to IdenTrust; the only information IdenTrust receives and sends back to the banks is 
validation of participant identities. All individuals and systems using the network are 
identified using IdenTrust digital certificates [25].  
Overall, IdenTrust supplies the technology and legal mechanisms to let Internet 
trading partners trust in another's identity. This enables their customer companies to 
use the Internet to open new markets, reduce transaction costs and create auditable 
records of their transactions. Hence the costs incurred by identity products are ulti-
mately beneficial or even necessary for such companies, even if they at first look 
appear as a cost alone [26].  
Nevertheless, the primary benefit of analysing the IdenTrust products and services 
is that it helps us understand in detail the economics of identity as a cost. The Iden-
Trust products differentiate between costs associated with electronic identification: 
the PKI technology itself, infrastructure, support services, service setup and manage-
ment, as well as specific transactions for which credentials are needed. In addition, 
the IdenTrust products can also be used to provide estimates of the costs more spe-
cific identity related issues, such as protection against online fraud, or the setup of an 
account for a particular purpose. Once the different types of identity related costs are 
distinguished, they become easier to quantify, though arriving at exact figures remains 
very challenging.  
The obvious drawback of looking at identity just as a cost is that the positive value 
of the identification services is, quite often, not fully recognised. Instead, it is taken 
(almost) for granted that companies will need to purchase these services as a regular 
part of their operations. While this may be true, this lack of recognition of the value-
generating aspects of identity could mean that companies such as IdenTrust are un-
able to fully capitalise on the economic possibilities of electronic identity. Hence, we 
can say that looking at identity from a pure cost perspective is viable only as a partial 
approach. It is helpful in assessing the related costs, but to arrive at a fuller under-
standing of economics of identity, methods and insights from other schools of thought 
are also needed. 
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In this approach, the cost of its provision will be paid for by companies purchasing 
the services from IdenTrust, but will ultimately be charged to their customers. 
Whether the client companies need an electronic identity of a certain kind and level of 
security to comply with governmental regulations, to satisfy their customers' expecta-
tions, or to be able to run their operations more efficiently and attract more business, 
the advantages brought about by the services offset the cost of the identification ser-
vices. Therefore the economic benefits of the eIdentity services are always implicitly 
recognised. 
4   Conclusions for Policymakers 
It is evident that the various economic approaches allocate a different, but by itself 
incomplete, function to identity as an economic object. Consequently, we believe that 
none of the approaches suffices by itself to analyse economics of identity in a satis-
factory way. Instead, this can only be achieved by combining the understandings and 
methodologies of each one.  
Each of the schools of thought has specific consequences for regulators and other 
policymakers, both on a national and European level. As discussed above, the tradi-
tional approach is to treat identity as a cost. This has the advantages of making poli-
cymakers aware of the magnitude of identity-related costs as well as the fact that 
there must be significant benefits to render positive the overall economics of deploy-
ing identity infrastructures. There is a wide variety of economically significant  
identity, privacy and data protection issues, recognised by identity management com-
panies such as IdenTrust, and who seek to address these issues through their product 
portfolios, including the identification and measurement of the various associated 
costs. By following the activities of such companies and the markets they address, it 
becomes easier for policymakers to monitor the various identity related costs in 
different markets, and consequently formulate suitable policy actions in each of 
them. 
Understanding identity as a consumption good or as a capital asset both have the 
advantage of emphasizing the transactional role of identity. In many transactions, it 
is not necessary or even appropriate to link a participant to a transaction with a spe-
cific living individual. For example, in cash transactions, the buyer only has to be in 
possession of a sufficient amount of money, not to reveal her identity; while in other 
cases it may be necessary for either the buyer or the seller to identify herself. In yet 
other transactions, identities themselves form a part of the transaction. Companies 
such as BBS function as identity providers for all these different types of transactions, 
while their customer is the stakeholder that ultimately remains in control of (and re-
sponsible for) the actual use of the identities. What this means for policymakers is that 
they have to be prepared to recognise the various ways in which personal identity data 
is used in different transactions, and be ready to adopt regulatory measures most suit-
able to each particular situation.  
However, one difficulty with this understanding of economics of identity is that it 
is not always easy for users to understand how their personal identity data are used. 
This issue is made more serious by the privacy paradox: the fact that users are in 
practice not as conscious of privacy implications of transactions as they claim to be. 
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This is already partly addressed by BBS and other identity providers: these companies 
offer identity management and support services precisely because their customers 
need advice on how to manage their identities and identity data more securely and 
efficiently. However, as valuable as the corrective actions within the marketplace are, 
these issues also need to be addressed by policymakers. They should make it as easy 
as possible for business and citizens to manage their personal information. This 
can take place by improving citizen awareness, by providing them accurate and rea-
sonably detailed (but not overly so) information about electronic identities and per-
sonal data management, and by making it necessary for companies to clearly disclose 
their privacy policies and practices. 
Analysing identity as a capital asset has the particular advantage of acknowledging 
the various roles, and hence economic values, that an electronic identity can have 
depending on the situation. As the value of identity changes according to the extent of 
its use and the passing of time, so do the ways in which the identity generates value. 
However, this granularity complicates things for policymakers: it can be difficult just 
to recognise all the different roles of identity, let alone to reliably measure the mone-
tary value that each one may have. It is therefore necessary for policymakers to 
create appropriate tools, both conventional and novel, to measure the value of 
identity in different situations. This should include the monitoring and quantitative 
analysis of the activities of the major players in the marketplace, including IdenTrust 
and BBS. Only this makes it possible to accurately analyse identity as a capital asset. 
Finally, when identity is considered as a social good, the main benefit that emerges 
from this approach is recognising the economic value of identity in social net-
works. By analysing how and why the value of identity increases as more stake-
holders become aware and use it in transactions, for example in the business models 
of eBay and other online retail companies, policymakers become more conscious of 
the ways in which the identity of one stakeholder can interact with those of others, 
and how these interactions create value in the whole network. However, for this kind 
of analysis to be possible, it has to be clearly defined who the provider of identity 
actually is (e.g. state or private, which private stakeholder), and how the identity can 
in practice be used in transactions. The eBay business model is again useful for un-
derstanding these issues better, because it very clearly demarcates the roles and vary-
ing responsibilities of buyers, sellers and the service provider itself.  
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